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The controversy surrounding the role played by the 
manufacturing sector in the development of the Brazilian 
economy has intensified recently, given the finding that 
the sector’s share in gross domestic product (gdp) has 
been declining on a more or less sustained basis since 
the 1980s, and at a faster pace since the economic 
stabilization of the first half of the 1990s (Marquetti, 
2002; Palma, 2005; Barros and Pereira, 2008; Bresser-
Pereira, 2008; Nassif, 2008a; Oreiro and Feijó, 2010, 
among others). The controversy in particular concerns 
the effect of exchange-rate appreciation on potential 
industrial performance.
The appreciation of the real lasted throughout much 
of the 1990s and was interrupted by a change in the 
exchange-rate regime in January 1999. Since 2003 the 
Brazilian currency had been strengthening again, and 
the terms of trade have also been improving. Although 
exchange-rate appreciation benefits the productive sector 
by lowering the cost of imported inputs and capital 
goods, it also discourages exports. The repercussion on 
the productive structure depends on how those effects 
translate into higher productivity to offset the relative 
loss of competitiveness. Nonetheless, the effect of an 
over-valued exchange rate on the productive structure 
can only be positive if it contributes to structural change 
that expands the supply of products with a high income-
elasticity of exports, and reduces dependency on products 
that have a low income- elasticity of imports. According 
to Thirlwall’s law, if that occurred, long-term growth 
capacity would be increasing; in other words the external 
constraint on growth would be easing. 
This article analyses the extent to which the declining 
share of the manufacturing sector in Brazil’s gdp reflects 
a productive restructuring process that would enable the 
country to move closer to the technological frontier, 
or else a regression in the industrial structure that is 
likely to reduce future growth potential. According to 
the traditional economic-development approach, deeper 
productive specialization reflects the workings of the 
market, so the economic liberalization that has occurred 
since the 1990s should have facilitated a modernization 
of the industrial structure, despite the preponderance 
of low-technology products. In contrast, the heterodox 
approach not only proposes a manufacturing development 
model based on industries of higher technological content, 
but it also views economic growth as determined by the 
momentum of an industry that is competitive in producing 
technology-intensive goods. 
The analysis reported in this article is framed 
by the postulates put forward by Kaldor, who, while 
recognizing the importance of the manufacturing sector 
as a factor of economic development, showed that a 
more technologically sophisticated industrial structure 
involves more robust and complex intra- and inter-sectoral 
linkages, which increase potential growth. Application 
of the Kaldor postulates to the Brazilian case in the 
1990s and first decade of the new century, supported 
by descriptive statistics, shows that despite the potential 
for modernization afforded by economic liberalization, 
the changing sector composition of industry reveals a 
process of specialization in the production of goods 
of low technological intensity. The appreciating trend 
of the Brazilian currency, following domestic-price 
stabilization, is identified as a key factor explaining 
the country’s difficulty in furthering structural change 
to acquire a more advanced technological profile. This 
article contributes by showing that, over a period of two 
decades, the currency-appreciation trend may have had a 
positive influence in the initial phase of price stabilization, 
but that its persistence in a context of ample international 
liquidity puts the evolution of industry at risk 
Apart from this brief introduction, this article is 
divided into three sections. Section II describes Kaldor’s 
theoretical framework, which analyses the special role 
played by the manufacturing sector in the economic-
development process. Section III uses empirical arguments 
to characterize the changes that have occurred in Brazil’s 
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Efforts to understand the economic development 
process of less developed countries first appeared on 
economists’ research agenda in the 1940s and 1950s, 
when the structuralist thinking started to be articulated 
by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (eclac). Progress in the theoretical debate 
turned structuralist economic policy into the defender 
of the industrialization of non-industrialized countries, 
with a view to improving their economies’ participation 
in trade flows. In practice, late industrialization gave 
countries on the periphery a highly heterogeneous and 
relatively undiversified productive structure, in contrast 
to the more homogeneous and highly diversified structure 
of the central economies. 
Apart from displaying widely varying productive 
structures in terms of productivity and factor remuneration, 
the industrialization process based on import substitution 
in the peripheral economies faced chronic balance of 
payment problems before industrialization was fully 
completed.1 In fact, it proved impossible to complete 
the process because of the external constraint on growth. 
Kaldor’s work in the 1960s and 1970s describes how 
a comprehensive industrialization process ought to 
be adopted.
A. Kaldor and the four phases of economic 
development
According to Kaldor, the maturity of an economy depends 
on its having completed the industrial development 
process. Kaldor (1966) distinguishes four development 
phases in the industrialization process, and argues that 
the maturing of an “immature” economy is based on the 
growth of aggregate demand.2 From this standpoint, the 
capital accumulation generated by the industrialization 
process is the key variable of economic development, 
since it speeds up technological change to the benefit 
of the entire economy — as reflected in lower unit costs 
1   For a more detailed historical assessment of this process in the 
region, see Bértola and Ocampo (2010), among others.
2   An immature economy is characterized by a large supply of 
labour in low-productivity sectors, which can be absorbed by more 
productive sectors as the industrialization process spreads towards 
them. Countries would attain the maturity phase when productivity 
levels become aligned.
and higher-quality export products, enabling domestic 
producers to compete on foreign markets. 
The application of the four-phase industrial 
development analytical framework makes it possible to 
evaluate economic development according to Kaldor’s 
principles. The scheme recognizes that a country’s 
industrialization process can occur cumulatively, which 
means that the production of consumer goods would 
precede the production of capital goods, which, in both 
cases and in their initial stages, would be export-oriented, 
in other words targeting external demand.
The first phase of development gives rise to a 
domestic industry producing consumer goods, as has been 
seen in the industrialization process in most countries, 
especially Latin American ones. This stage would reduce 
reliance on imports of this type of good; but the domestic 
production of machinery and equipment also begins in 
that phase, since the expansion of demand for consumer 
goods would stimulate an increase in the supply of 
certain types of machinery that domestic industry would 
be technological able to produce. Nonetheless, most of 
the capital goods used would continue to be imported, 
particularly those involving more advanced technology; 
but not all state-of-the-art technology would be exported 
by the more developed countries. Kaldor considered 
that the introduction and production of consumer goods 
is relatively swift and is exhausted when the import-
substitution process for this type of goods is concluded. 
To sustain rapid growth rates, the industrialization 
process has to enter a second phase, in which the 
consumer-goods-producing sector needs to start 
exporting its surpluses, thereby making it possible to 
sustain demand and expand specialization. Argyrous 
(1996) states that in the first two phases, it would be 
possible to create the conditions for the economy to 
specialize in the production of capital goods, which 
leads to the following phase.3 At some point in the 
industrial development process, reliance on imported 
technology and capital could hold back output growth. 
But, at some stage of the industrialization process, the 
external constraint should presumably be eased, making 
3  Kaldor (1966) uses the term “specialization” to indicate that the 
sector competes on an equal footing in the international market in 
terms of productivity and technology endowment.
II
Kaldor’s structuralist analytical framework
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it possible to overcome reliance on foreign capital and 
technology. The third phase would begin when the country 
started to adopt measures to promote the substitution 
of capital-goods imports. Kaldor (1970) considered 
that large-scale investments in the capital goods sector 
would lead to greater productivity growth and would 
help raise competitiveness.
In the third phase, the country also needs to develop 
its own technology, which can be incorporated in domestic 
machinery and equipment, and consolidate the share 
of the capital-goods sector in the domestic productive 
structure. Among other things, measures to develop 
technological capacity should lead to the creation of 
new products making it possible to expand exports of 
more technologically intensive goods, which in turn 
would compensate for the import growth generated 
by higher incomes and the consequent increase in 
endogenous demand. The fourth phase, which completes 
the industrialization process, corresponds to the stage 
in which the country becomes a capital-goods exporter. 
In this phase, the capital-goods-producing sector would 
have achieved a technological maturity similar to that 
of the industrialized countries. Kaldor (1966) believed 
economic growth would increase significantly in this 
latter phase, driven by domestic and external demand 
for both consumer and capital goods.
Argyrous (1996) considers that success in exporting 
capital goods follows a lengthy cumulative development 
period driven by mass production in domestic industries 
using capital goods. Economic policies that restrict the 
production of capital goods could therefore obstruct the 
virtuous growth circle. 
The thesis set forth in this article in relation to the 
Brazilian economy is that, although Brazil had already 
developed a complex industrial fabric in the period 
between the end of World War II and the mid-1980s, 
according to Kaldor’s theory it had not progressed fast 
enough, basically because the final phases of development 
had not been completed (see section III.A).4 a clear 
indicator of the incomplete nature of the process is the 
fact that the trade balance displays a structural deficit in 
more technology-intensive goods, which means that the 
country is a net importer of capital goods (see section 
III.B). Moreover, in the last few years since 2004, the 
domestic and international situations have not favoured 
the industrialization process (see section III.C), and 
Brazil has become one of the world’s slowest growing 
emerging economies. 
4  For an evaluation of the major influence of Brazil’s industrial sector 
on the growth rate of manufacturing industry and other sectors of the 
economy, see Nakabashi, Scatolin and da Cruz (2010).
Kaldor’s theory of development phases can be 
complemented with the analysis made by Fajnzylber 
(2000, p. 871), according to which it is essential that 
an economy, including an industrialized one, has an 
“endogenous core of technological dynamism” to 
overcome the external vulnerability of growth. Several 
development authors agree with this idea. For example, 
Furtado (1984) argues that a developing economy with 
an incomplete industrialization process would have to 
resort to “creativity” to promote growth, in other words 
technological innovation. Furtado (1984, p. 27) also 
suggests that the lack of creativity in Brazil reflects the 
fact that its late industrialization occurred in the form 
of imitative development. Fajnzylber (1983, p. 286) 
argues that development of the capital-goods-producing 
sector would not be sufficient, and an “endogenous 
core of technical progress” would need to be created, 
technologically strengthened and articulated with the 
entire productive system to provide it with dynamism and 
achieve the productive excellence necessary to penetrate 
and remain in the international market.5
The development of this core would reflect the 
evolution of the economy in its third and fourth phases. 
On this path, technological progress becomes a key 
factor for increasing productivity growth and making 
the economy more competitive; but also to make it 
possible to expand exports based on the income generated 
by technology, which in turn would help mitigate the 
external constraint on growth. Consequently, and thus 
concluding the industrialization process, economies 
that are capable of developing and absorbing new 
technologies change the sectoral structure of industry 
and disseminate technical changes throughout (Cimoli 
and others, 2005, p. 12).
Kaldor’s description of the industrialization process 
by stages is related to his thesis on role played by 
manufacturing industry in the economic growth process, 
known in the literature as “Kaldor’s laws”.6
5  Fajnzylber (1983) considered that the lack of a well-developed capital 
goods producing sector, given the incomplete nature of industrialization 
in Latin America, was one of the basic causes of the chronic trade 
deficit of its economies, and had also prevented them from achieving 
levels of productive excellence.
6  Kaldor did not present his postulates as economic “laws”, but they 
are known as such in the history of economic thought. The author 
probably contributed to that himself by not questioning their definition 
as laws in the debate following their presentation. The fact that Kaldor 
did not explicitly defined his postulates as “laws” has given rise to 
differences of interpretation as to their number, which varies between 
three (Targetti and Thirwall, 1989) and four (Targetti, 1992). This 
article adopts the latter position.
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B. Kaldor’s laws and growth conceived as 
industrial development
Kaldor’s analysis of development phases is complemented 
by “Kaldor’s laws” explaining the dynamic of economic 
growth. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kaldor developed a set 
of theoretical proposals that depart from the neoclassical 
approach, in explaining countries’ different growth 
dynamics in terms of factors related to aggregate 
demand. After formulating his growth theory based on 
capital accumulation and the distribution of income in 
the 1950s and early 1960s, Kaldor envisaged a growth 
model based on the principle of circular cumulative 
causation, which paid special attention to changes 
in the productive structure. In his opinion, aggregate 
demand levels across countries reflected differences 
in their productive structures, for which reason he 
saw the manufacturing sector as crucially important 
for economic growth, since that sector would enjoy 
increasing returns to scale, which would help increase 
productivity throughout the economy. 
Kaldor (1966 and 1970) formulated a set of laws that 
used stylized facts to explain the dynamic of capitalist 
economies and, in particular, the differences between 
their growth rates.7 Kaldor’s laws postulate the following: 
First law: There is a positive relation between growth 
and the aggregate output of the manufacturing sector, 
such that the higher the growth rate of that sector, the 
higher is the rate of growth of gdp. The industrial sector 
becomes the “engine of growth” given its dynamism 
and dissemination of innovations. The internal linkages 
within the manufacturing sector and its linkages with 
other sectors induces productivity growth both inside 
and outside. When industry has increasing returns, 
changes in the productive process are disseminated on 
a sustained and cumulative basis. 
Second law: There is a positive relation between 
the rate of growth of productivity in the manufacturing 
sector, and growth of the respective output, owing to a 
causation relation whereby the higher the growth rate 
of that sector, the faster is also the rate of productivity 
increase. This law is known as the “Kaldor-Verdoorn 
law”. An increase in output induced by an expansion 
of demand leads to productivity growth in sectors that 
7  Kaldor did not perform econometric tests using developing country 
data, but his arguments aroused great interest among several of his 
followers, which made it possible to expand his model and test it in 
other economic contexts.
have dynamic economies of scale. This law explains 
why trading relations between the manufacturing sector 
and other sectors of the economy make it possible for 
the first law to be satisfied.
Third law: The higher the growth rate of exports, the 
greater is the increase in gdp. According to Kaldor, in the 
more advanced phases of economic development, gdp 
growth would be fuelled by increasing export demand. 
This idea assumes that the expansion of industrial activity 
would raise productivity in the manufacturing sector, 
which would enhance the competitiveness of exports and 
stimulate their growth. This, in turn, would lead to an 
increase in the economy’s overall gdp. This development 
model would translate into a cumulative growth process 
based on increasing returns in the manufacturing sector. 
The cumulative causality relation reflects the existence 
of dynamic and increasing returns to scale in the 
industrial sector, stemming from the technical progress 
stimulated by the expansion of output. The existence of 
economies of scale raises industrial productivity, which 
generates greater income for firms and, hence, expands 
their investment capacity. Consequently, manufacturing 
growth would boost productivity and help to speed up 
technological change throughout the economy, thereby 
strengthening its competitiveness on the external market.
Fourth law: The long-term growth of the economy 
is not constrained by supply, but by demand; thus, in 
an open economy, the balance of payments is the main 
demand constraint on output growth. The sustainability 
of economic growth would depend on the country’s 
capacity to maintain export competitiveness, which 
in turn would depend on productivity growth in the 
manufacturing sector (second law).8 This means that 
output growth, ultimately conditioned by the trend of 
productivity and the economy’s learning capacity, should 
occur when the balance of payments is in equilibrium. 
So growth rates of both industrial productivity and 
gdp are determined by the rate of growth of exports in 
relation to the income-elasticity of demand for imports 
(Thirlwall, 1983).
The balance of payments equilibrium condition 
shows how exports help to ease the constraint that this 
imposes through time. If, in the development process, 
the level of exports fails to increase as needed to cover 
8  The third and fourth laws are closely related. These two laws were 
formulated by Kaldor (1970) and subsequently formalized by Dixon 
and Thirlwall (1975) and Thirlwall (1979).
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the additional import expenses, aggregate demand would 
have to contract in the long run, and this would reduce 
employment and output. Accordingly, expanding exports 
is of strategic importance for the sustainability of growth. 
Nonetheless, according to the Kaldor-Thirlwall model, 
the effect of exports on gdp growth depends on each 
country’s productive structure. If the economy has not 
attained a level of industrialization that enables it to 
exploit the benefits of cumulative causality, policy-makers 
should implement structural changes that lead towards 
that development model. Such measures should focus on 
industries with increasing returns to scale, particularly 
those producing goods of higher technological content 
and unit value, in other words industries that make use 
of a differentiated and science-based technology.9 
9  Prebisch (2000) argues that exports can make a major contribution 
to mitigating the external constraint on growth. Accordingly the 
Kaldor-Thirlwall model and Prebisch’s centre-periphery model share 
an interest in the potential effects of balance of payments deficits for 
long-term growth. Although the first model is based on the developed 
economies and the second on developing economies, the analysis 
of the income-elasticity of demand for imports and exports and the 
In short, Kaldor believes that the capital accumulation 
incorporated in modern technologies leads to the 
conception of a sustained process of industrial change 
and facilitates significant changes in the productive 
structure, which enables the economy to match that of 
the countries with the highest productivity levels. This 
author recognizes that capital accumulation has a double 
effect on labour productivity, which increases both 
because workers use better machinery and because of 
the learning-by-doing process. Consequently, developing 
economies should adopt a policy aimed at capital 
accumulation to speed up the industrialization process, 
since the development of a technologically advanced 
industrial sector is a fundamental basis for sustaining 
long-term growth. 
effects these have on the growth path of the countries considered in 
both models produce converging conclusions. Mention should also 
be made of the vast Schumpeterian literature which corroborates 
Kaldor’s postulates on the dynamic of increasing returns. See Dosi, 




The acceleration of Brazil’s industrialization process lasted 
from the end of World War II until the mid-1980s, with 
value added by the industrial sector growing from 20% of 
gdp in 1947 to 36% of gdp in 1985. From then on it started 
to decline, and by 2010 represented little over 15%. From 
the growth dynamic standpoint, there is a close correlation 
between the expansion of the manufacturing sector and 
gdp growth (see figure 1). Until 1980, industrial output 
grew faster than gdp in most years; but in the 30 years 
between the external debt crisis in the early 1980s and 
2010, the growth of industrial value added only outpaced 
gdp on 10 occasions. Accordingly, the years in which the 
manufacturing sector grew fastest coincide with those of 
highest gdp growth. Figure 2 shows cumulative growth 
rates since 1970 and the relation between the expansion 
path in the industrial sector and the economy at large. 
Since 1980, in a changing international liquidity context, 
the manufacturing sector ceased to lead growth of the 
Brazilian economy.
Given the close correlation that exists between 
the growth of manufacturing industry and gdp growth, 
industrial development cycles tend to move in harmony 
with the cycles of development in the Brazilian economy 
as a whole. The manufacturing sector expanded rapidly 
between 1950 and 1980, after which it started to slow. 
In the period 1981-2008, the industry growth path was 
affected by periods of high inflation between 1980 and 
1994, international liquidity shortage in the 1980s, foreign 
exchange crises in the second half of the 1990s, and other 
events that diminished the dynamism of the sector. In 
this context, there was increasing uncertainty following 
the change of exchange-rate regime in January 1999, the 
energy crisis of 2001, the crisis of confidence caused by 
the election of the first left-wing president in 2002-2003, 
and the international financial crisis of the last quarter 
of 2008. Moreover in the 1980s there were changes in 
the way development policy was managed, specifically 
economic liberalization and market promoting reforms, 
which significantly changed the macroeconomic context 
of industrial development.
Following the adoption of the Target Plan in the 
1950s, the government applied an industrial development 
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FIGURE 1









































































GDP Value added by the manufacturing sector
Source: National accounts and the economic and financial database (Ipeadata) of the Institute of Applied Economic Research (ipea) of Brazil.
gdp: Gross domestic product.
FIGURE 2






















































Source: National accounts and the economic and financial database (Ipeadata) of the Institute of Applied Economic Research (ipea) of Brazil.
a Base 1970=100.
 gdp: Gross domestic product.
policy based on import substitution. In the 1970s, new 
steps were taken to develop an industrial sector that 
also produced goods and services based on scientific 
knowledge and with a differentiated technological base; 
but the external debt crisis, acceleration of inflation, and, 
no less important, growth of the public-sector deficit, 
conspired to interrupt this process. Once inflation had 
been brought under control in 1994, and in an open 
macroeconomic context, those industrial sectors did not 
have an environment that enabled them to increase their 
share in industrial gdp, which remained unchanged. It can 
therefore be said that one of the explanatory factors for the 
reduction in the industrial growth rate since 1980 could 
be the change in productive structure, which involved a 
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relative loss of dynamism in industries producing more 
technologically sophisticated goods. 
Figure 3 compares the growth trend of the capital-
goods-producing sector, in which industries based on 
scientific knowledge and differentiated technology are 
concentrated, with the evolution of the manufacturing 
sector since 1975.10 According to the Kaldor postulates, 
these industries are precisely those that would be in a 
position to increase the gdp growth rate, insofar as their 
growth outpaced that of the other industrial sectors. 
This property relates to the privileged position of the 
machinery- and equipment-producing sector in the 
industrial productive chain, since it has tight backward 
and forward linkages with the other economic sectors. 
After a rapid growth phase in the 1970s, this sector 
performed more sluggishly in the 1980s, before expanding 
by less than the industrial average owing to the economic 
liberalization of the 1990s. Since 2003, growth has been 
boosted again by the start of a new cycle of investments 
in the economy, although this was interrupted by the 
international financial crisis in late 2008. 
10  From that year on, monthly statistics have been published on the trend 
of industrial sectors, classified by final destination, compiled through 
the Monthly Survey of Industry - Physical Production, undertaken by 
the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (ibge).
To provide a more in-depth analysis of the view 
that the composition of the Brazilian industrial sector 
has not evolved so as to ease the external constraint on 
growth, the following subsections review its behaviour 
since the 1970s in terms of three analytical elements: 
the changes that have occurred owing to the composition 
of the gdp of the manufacturing and extraction sectors, 
by degree of technological intensity; indicators of the 
evolution of the industrial sector in the different phases 
of development identified by Kaldor, based on the trade 
balances of the consumer durables and capital goods 
sectors; and, lastly, a review of industry after economic 
liberalization. 
A. Brazilian industry since the 1970s and 
phases of industrialization
The import-substitution process supported by development 
promoting policies should have been completed in the 
1980s, when the share of the manufacturing sector 
surpassed 30%.11 Table 1 shows the trend of the 
sector shares in economic activity, classified by type 
11  See the analyses of the stages of Brazil’s industrial development 
discussed in Bacha and Bonelli (2005) and Lamonica and Feijó 
(2011), among others.
FIGURE 3



















































Source: Monthly Survey of Industry - Physical Production undertaken by the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (ibge), historical 
series and new series.
a Base 1991=100.
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TABLE 1
Percentage share of value-added by manufacturing industry and mineral extraction, 
according to technological intensity, by sectors 1970, 1985, 1996 and 2007




1970 1985 1996 2007 1970-2007
Natural resource-based 32.6 34.0 32.6 41.0 8.4
Mineral, oil and gas extraction 2.9 4.7 1.6 4.0 1.1
Production of nonmetallic minerals and cement 3.4 3.0 2.5 1.7 -1.7
Metallurgy of non-ferrous minerals 1.4 1.9 1.2 1.8 0.4
Wood products 2.4 1.4 1.1 1.3 -1.1
Manufacture of paper and pulps for paper manufacture 0.1 1.6 0.7 0.6 0.4
Leather manufacture 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 -0.3
Food, beverages and tobacco 16.5 12.8 18.3 16.1 -0.4
Manufacture of alcohol and derivatives 2.0 3.0 1.5 0.8 -1.2
Manufacture of coke and oil refining 3.4 5.2 5.4 14.5 11.1
Labour-intensive 15.9 15.3 13.6 10.1 -5.8
Travel accessories and leather articles 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Textiles 9.3 5.5 3.3 1.9 -7.4
Clothing, footwear and fabric articles 3.3 4.7 4.1 3.0 -0.3
Miscellaneous products 1.3 1.5 2.3 1.6 0.4
Manufacture of metal products (except machinery and equipment) 1.9 3.5 3.8 3.5 1.7
Scale-intensive 37.1 35.9 35.8 33.7 -3.4
Basic metallurgy 10.1 9.4 4.2 6.1 -4.0
Automobiles 6.3 4.7 8.1 8.5 2.3
Transport equipment (except aircraft) 1.7 0.8 0.6 1.3 -0.3
Rubber and plastic 3.8 3.8 4.1 3.3 -0.6
Manufacture of products and articles made of paper and paperboard 2.4 1.2 3.1 2.8 0.3
Manufacture of perfume articles  ... … … 1.2 1.2
Chemical products 6.6 13.4 9.2 6.4 -0.2
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recordings 3.9 1.9 4.9 2.8 -1.1
Ceramic products for civil construction and miscellaneous uses 1.4 0.2 1.0 0.7 -0.6
Glass and glass products 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.5 -0.4
Sectors that apply differentiated technologies 9.9 10.9 13.0 10.5 0.6
Optical instruments, chronometers and watches 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0
Equipment of medical and therapeutic use 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1
Electrical and electronic appliances, communication apparatus and equipment 4.4 5.2 5.7 4.0 -0.4
Machinery and equipment 5.1 4.9 6.8 6.0 1.0
Scientific knowledge-based 4.5 3.9 5.0 4.6 0.1
Office equipment and computer hardware 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.3
Pharmaceutical (and veterinary) products 3.4 1.6 3.4 2.7 -0.7
Measurement, testing and control apparatus and instruments 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1
Electrical energy distribution equipment 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.3 -0.3
Aircraft production and assembly … 0.4 0.2 0.7 -
Machinery and apparatus for industrial robotization  … 0.2 0.1 0.1 -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 -
Source: Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (ibge), Industrial Census of 1970 and 1985 and Annual Industrial Survey of 1996 
and 2007.
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of technology used in the selected years.12 The table 
shows that the productive structure obtained from the 
industrialization process was quite differentiated even 
in 1970; but there was very little representation of 
sectors based on differentiated technology and scientific 
knowledge. Two development programmes were 
implemented in the 1970s: the first National Development 
Plan, which lasted from 1968 to 1973; and the second 
National Development Plan from 1974 to 1979. These 
made it possible to consolidate the process of diversifying 
Brazil’s industrial structure, but without the parallel 
creation of a technological innovation development core. 
The existence of a differentiated industry, specialized 
in medium- and low-technology sectors, lasted into the 
following decade, when the most important changes in 
the productive structure occurred in industries that make 
intensive use of natural resources and labour, and also 
in scale-intensive industries. 
The contribution to value-added made by high- and 
medium-high technology sectors, which form part of 
the Brazilian industrial sector based on differentiated 
technologies and scientific knowledge, increased, 
because they required a larger contribution of capital 
and technology. In the first case (sectors based on 
differentiated technologies), their share of industrial 
value-added rose by 0.6% between 1970 and 2007, 
and their share of total value added was about 10%; 
whereas in the second case (sectors based on scientific 
knowledge), the contribution to value-added increased 
by just 0.1%, for a total contribution of around 5% in 
that period. 
Given Brazil’s comparative advantages and its 
continental size, it might be expected that the process of 
consolidating its industrial fabric would start in sectors 
specialized in basic industrial products. In fact, in 1970, 
sectors engaged in the intensive exploitation of natural 
resources already contributed over 30% of industrial 
value-added, whereas 16.5% of the total contribution 
came from the food, beverages and tobacco industries. 
This share had shrunk to 12.8% in 1985, although it 
increased again in 1996 and in 2007, to reach practically 
the same level as in 1970 (16.1%), thus becoming the 
most important industrial sector. Despite the relative 
stability of the percentage share of this activity, and 
 
12  The literature on the subject has used this classification widely. 
See Nassif (2008a), among others. The years were selected on the 
basis of the availability of official figures. In 1970 and 1985, industrial 
censuses were conducted, which since 1996 were replaced by the Annual 
Industrial Survey. Feijó and Carvalho (1999) analyse the availability 
of official statistics on Brazil’s manufacturing sector in the 1990s.
taking account of the years of extreme performance, the 
category of industries specialized in the exploitation of 
natural resources increased its share by 8.4% between 
1970 and 2007. This increase was basically due to a 
higher share of activities such as oil drilling and refining, 
which accounted for 3.4% of total value-added in 1970, 
but only about 14.5% in 2007. The increasing importance 
of this sector has lasted since the end of the 1990s and 
reflects the start of a major change in Brazilian industry’s 
participation in world trade.
Labour-intensive industries maintained a share of 
around 15% between 1970 and 1985, but this started 
to shrink from then onwards, so that by 2007 their 
contribution to total value-added was 10.1%. The most 
important change in this category occurred in the textile 
industry, whose share has been declining systematically. 
The contribution of garment-producing industries 
fluctuated between a high of 4.7% in 1985 and 3.0% 
in 2007, while the share of industries producing metal 
products in total value-added consolidated around 3.0% 
as from 1985.
The share of scale-intensive industries has also 
been declining, although their contribution of roughly 
30% to industrial value-added suggests that the first and 
second phases of Kaldor’s chronological sequence in the 
industrialization of Brazil’s manufacturing sector are 
clearly consolidated. Sectors in this category provide 
inputs for producing intermediate goods, both consumer 
and capital goods (basic metallurgy, rubber and plastic, 
chemical products, ceramic products and glass and glass 
products), while also encompassing the consumer-
goods sectors, and the production of vehicles, perfume 
products and publishing, printing and reproduction of 
recordings. The greatest changes have occurred in the 
basic metallurgy sector, whose share decreased from 
1970 to 2007, and in the vehicle sector, whose share 
increased. The chemical products sector accounted for 
13.4% of total industrial value-added in 1985, the largest 
share in that year. Since then, its contribution remained 
around 9% until 2000, but in 2007 it dropped to 6.4%, 
a similar proportion to 1970.
The shares of sectors based on differentiated 
technologies and scientific knowledge, which encompass 
the capital-goods producing sectors, have not changed 
much between 1970 and 2007. Nonetheless, the average 
contribution of these categories in the period analysed 
(almost 15% of industrial value-added) shows that 
Brazil’s industrialization process has now entered the 
third phase, by virtue of the expansion and diversification 
of the productive structure and the large share of the 
capital-goods producing sector. 
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In terms of the chronological sequence of the 
phases of industrial development, the spread of the 
industrialization process to more technology-intensive 
sectors would have been affected, even in the 1980s, 
by the depreciation of the currency and consequent 
increase in the cost of imported equipment, as well as 
by the heightened economic uncertainty stemming from 
the increase in inflation, among other factors. Currency 
depreciation and the rise in inflation were caused by 
greater external vulnerability, which was exacerbated 
by the Mexican crisis in 1982. In fact, the external debt 
crisis in the early 1980s interrupted the industrialization 
process, before the investments had had time to attain 
a sufficient volume to develop the endogenous core of 
national production envisaged by Fajnzylber (1983). 
Although the industrialization process was 
interrupted before reaching its conclusion according 
to Kaldor’s four-phase model, there were large trade 
surpluses in the first half of the 1980s, coinciding with 
the stage in which the Brazilian economy was subject 
to a major external constraint. Castro and Souza (2004) 
attribute these surpluses to the maturing of the structural 
changes generated by the second National Development 
Plan, which had been applied in the period 1974-1979.
In brief, comparing the situation in 1970 with that 
prevailing in 2007 shows that changes in the productive 
structure were heavily circumscribed. The increase in the 
relative share of natural-resource-based sectors mirrors 
the growing importance of the oil industry, whereas 
the declining relative importance of labour-intensive 
sectors is caused by the decreasing share of the textile 
industry. The relative loss of importance of the scale-
intensive segment reflects the declining importance of 
the basic metallurgy industry. The share of industrial 
categories based on differentiated technologies and 
scientific knowledge changes little between the first and 
last year considered in table 1. All of the above reveals 
the clear trend of the Brazilian industrial sector towards 
specialization in natural-resource-intensive activities. 
Given this propensity, Brazil’s industrial structure has 
proven relatively rigid over the last four decades. Changes 
in the relative share of the different sectors were more 
intense between 1985 and 2007, which accentuated the 
concentration of industry in the production of natural-
resource-intensive goods. According to the Kaldor 
industrial development model, Brazilian industry has 
not yet attained maturity. 
To complement this latter comment, figure 4 
uses another indicator to show how Brazilian industry 
needs to continue making progress to enter the maturity 
phase. Figure 4 shows the trend of aggregate content in 
relation to the value of output in the categories included 
FIGURE 4
share of value-added in the value of output of the manufacturing and mineral 









Total industrial sector Natural resources
Scale intensity
Intensive application of scientic knowledgeDifferentiated technology
Labour intensity
Source: Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (ibge), Industrial Census of 1985 and Annual Industrial Survey of 1996 and 2007.
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in table 1, for three years: 1985, when a major stage of 
the import substitution process can be assumed to have 
ended; 1996, when the effects of the liberalization that 
began in the early 1980s had already started to appear 
in the industrial structure; and 2007, the year before the 
international financial crisis.13 Given that the coefficient 
considered is declining in the industrial sector as a whole 
particularly in the post-economic liberalization period, it 
could be interpreted as showing that part of the demand 
that was previously met by domestic industry has now 
moved abroad. Several empirical studies highlight this 
effect as from the 1990s, which led to a deepening of 
the debate on the country’s deindustrialization.14 
Nonetheless, the industrial organization literature 
states that this coefficient really measures the degree of 
verticalization of the industrial sector; so a fall in the 
indicator would not necessarily mean a relative increase 
in the use of imported inputs, but, in contrast, could point 
to an intensification of industrial specialization. In the 
terms of this article, the question that arises is whether 
the strengthening of specialization in Brazilian industry 
which actually occurred, is occurring prematurely, given 
that the index of value-added of production started to 
decline throughout industry in 1996, in other words before 
it could reach maturity. Figure 4 shows that, between 
1985 and 1986 the coefficient rose from 0.46 to 0.47 for 
industry as a whole, and then fell back to 0.43 in 2007. 
The category of industrial sectors that make intensive use 
of natural resources is the only one that shows a slight 
increase in aggregate content between 1985 and 2007 
(from 0.47 to 0.48). All other categories record a loss 
in the capacity of domestic industry to add value to the 
manufacturing process — a loss that is more accentuated 
in the categories of sectors that make intensive use of 
scientific knowledge and differentiated technology, and 
in scale-intensive sectors.
B. Balance of trade in consumer durable goods 
and capital goods: from consolidation 
of the industrial sector to the economic 
liberalization of the 1990s 
The changes that have occurred in a country’s industrial 
structure can also be seen by analysing the international 
13  The ratio between value-added and the value of output is calculated 
by dividing the value of industrial processing, used by the ibge in 
industrial surveys of the last few years as a variable representing 
value- added, by the gross value of industrial output.
14  On this point, see the studies performed by the Industrial Development 
Research Institute (iedi). See also Feijó, Carvalho and Almeida (2005) 
and Oreiro and Feijó (2010), among others.
trade flow. In terms of sectors that produce final goods, 
figure 5 shows the trend of the trade balances in consumer 
durables and capital goods for the period 1974-2010. 
Brazilian industry was a net exporter of consumer durables 
from 1977 until 1993, a period in which the economy was 
still highly protected by customs duties and other trade 
barriers. The closed nature of the Brazilian economy was 
also reflected in the technological backwardness of this 
sector compared to other late-industrializing countries, 
particularly the “Asian tigers”. The trade liberalization 
of the early 1990s, together with currency appreciation, 
fuelled an increase in the volume of consumer goods 
imported, until the exchange-rate regime was altered in 
1999. The volume of durable goods exports grew again 
from the start of the first decade of the new century until 
2005, when exchange-rate appreciation caused a new 
contraction that turned the country into a net importer 
of consumer durables. 
Implementation of the second National Development 
Plan in the 1970s made it possible to strengthen the capital-
goods-producing sector, which was concentrated in the 
categories of activities based on the use of differentiated 
technologies and scientific knowledge, thereby making 
it possible to make progress in the third phase of the 
industrialization process. Nonetheless, for the sector to 
be able to mature, technological development is essential 
at the national level. Kaldor considers that economic 
growth and the alignment of a developing economy with 
the more developed economies requires mature industrial 
sectors with capacity to create and produce consumer 
goods locally for both the domestic and the external 
market. Trade statistics show that the Brazilian economy 
has not completed the fourth and final phase of industrial 
development and that, in most years since 1974, trade 
in capital goods has been in deficit. In the period 1974-
1984, when the capital goods sector consolidated thanks 
to the application of the second National Development 
Plan, imports outweighed exports. From 1985 to 1990, 
there were surpluses, except in 1986 and 1987, reflecting 
the faster growth of gdp. Since 1991, by which time the 
economic liberalization process had already begun, net 
imports of capital goods again grew vigorously, partly 
because the intensification of domestic competition 
stimulated a renewal of Brazil’s industrial fabric, which 
was facilitated by exchange-rate appreciation once inflation 
had been brought under control. In 2003, the country 
became a net exporter following a fall in the exchange 
rate, but in 2008 the trade balance started to reverse, and 
in 2010 it posted a record deficit of US$ 13.64 billion.
Comparing the figures shown in figure 5 with 
the information contained in table 1 shows that the 
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performance of the consumer-goods sector, which 
encompasses medium-high- and high- technology 
activities, remains insufficient to provide Brazilian 
industry with the dynamism it needs to become the 
engine of long-term economic growth —in other words, 
to reduce the external constraint on growth. An analysis 
of trade balances shows that changes in the productive 
structure over the years have not resulted in an effective 
increase in the share of the capital-goods sector, which 
requires further technological upgrading. Since the start 
of the economic liberalization process, installed industry 
has shown sufficient dynamism to modernize in terms 
of processes and the capital stock; but it has not found 
the momentum needed to make a technological leap 
that would enable it to start producing goods with a 
high technological content and high value-added. The 
absence of an active industrial policy in the economic 
liberalization stage clearly hampered this stage of the 
industrialization process. 
In a specific study on the behaviour of capital 
goods imports, (Nassif, 2008b) shows that these were 
harmed by changes in the macroeconomic environment. 
The growth of Brazilian capital-goods imports between 
1989 and 1998 not only reflects the initial effects of 
liberalization (1990-1994), but also those arising from 
a long period of currency overvaluation (1994-1998). In 
1999-2006, machinery and equipment imports slackened 
as a result of the sharp exchange-rate depreciation that 
occurred between 1999 and 2003 and the low growth 
rates of the Brazilian economy in the same period 
(Nassif, 2008b, p. 255).15
Kaldor considered that the most dynamic sectors of 
the economy, which could therefore raise the quality of 
exports, were those producing high- and medium-high-
technology goods. Figure 6 shows the trade balances of 
industrial products classified according to their technology 
intensity as from 1989, to demonstrate that economic 
liberalization and the consequent modernization of the 
industrial production process did not cause a reversal 
of the trade balance in goods of high- and medium-
high-technology content. The persistent exchange-rate 
appreciation, which began with price stabilization in 1994 
and, since 2004, the vigorous expansion of domestic 
demand, served to increase the deficit in this industrial 
category (high- and medium-high- technology goods) (see 
figure 7). While the over-valued exchange rate lowered 
the cost of imported capital goods, it has also made it 
harder to produce them domestically. Consequently, 
the deficit of the high- and medium-high-technology 
sector reflects the fact that Brazil is a net technology 
15  Nassif (2008b) notes that the sector is producing pumps, compressors 
and transmission parts; generators, transmission and electric motors; 
metallic structures and heavy boiler equipment, tanks and boilers. 
Meanwhile, machinery and tools that account for a larger share 
of capital goods exports have lost comparative advantage (Nassif, 
2008b, p. 258), indicating a loss of efficiency among the traditional 
or developed sectors in Brazil. 
FIGURE 5
Balance of trade in consumer durable and capital goods, 1974-2010













































Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Centre for Foreign Trade Studies Foundation (funcex), and the Economic 
and Financial Database (Ipeadata) of the Institute of Applied Economic Research (ipea) of Brazil.
120
ThE ImPoRTAnCE of ThE mAnUfACTURInG SECToR foR bRAzILIAn EConomIC dEVELoPmEnT  • 
CARmEm APARECIdA fEIJó And mARCoS ToSTES LAmonICA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 7  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 2
FIGURE 6
trade balance by sector technological intensity, 1989-2010
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Industrial Development Research Institute (iedi). (Deficit of US$ 34.8 billion in 
the manufacturing sector) US$ bilhões de déficit nos bens da indústria de transformação, Carta No. 451, 2011 [online] www.iedi.org.br/cartas.
FIGURE 7





































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil. 
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importer. The technological backwardness that this 
represents for the country shows that, in the long term, 
it is specializing in the production of low-technology 
goods and commodities, of which it is a net exporter. 
Although the trade balance has not been in deficit over 
the last decade, in general commodity exports have 
largely covered the deficit that the manufacturing sector 
has been accumulating since 2007 (iedi, 2011).
The growth of net commodity exports, together with 
an over-valued exchange rate, would not sustain long-
term growth in view of the sector’s scant contribution 
to rapid growth. Moreover, the maintenance of an 
appreciated exchange rate over a long period tends to 
cause a reallocation of resources that harms development 
and the domestic production of high- and medium-high- 
technology goods. Given the exchange-rate appreciation 
trend, the cost of importing industrial goods with 
higher technological content is less than the cost of 
producing them domestically. Thus, Brazil is moving 
in the opposite direction to that proposed by Kaldor 
and by structuralist theory as set out in the classic texts 
of Furtado and Fajnzylber, among others. Apart from 
the technical advances applied to the production of 
commodities, product or process innovations tend to 
come from abroad, which means that the “endogenous 
core of technical progress” would be oriented towards 
increasing the comparative advantages of the production 
and marketing of commodities, and that the income-
elasticity of demand for imports would continue to 
exceed the income-elasticity of exports.
Accordingly, although the productive sectors 
had already consolidated the first and second phases 
of industrialization and embarked on the third phase, 
the conditions did not exist for Brazil to catch up the 
industrialized countries after economic liberalization. 
This alignment can only happen when industrial-sector 
specialization leads to higher value-added in production, 
greater technological content, and greater dynamism 
in terms of a larger spillover effect on other sectors of 
the economy. Among other things, this process could 
lead less structural heterogeneity and better functional 
distribution of income. The trend of the industrial sector 
over the last few years shows that major changes are 
occurring that could be decisive for its transformation. 
C. recent industrial process and “Dutch 
disease”
An important factor for fulfilling the “Kaldor Laws” is 
the principle of circular cumulative causality. According 
to this principle, the increasing returns that start to appear 
in the manufacturing sector, after a given stage in the 
technological development of the productive structure, can 
be expected to enhance the competitiveness of exports, 
which in turn would help increase aggregate output. 
The interpretation of the recent structural changes in 
Brazilian industry shows that as the development phases 
have remained incomplete, the advantages of circular 
cumulative causality possibly do not materialize. To 
catch up the more advanced economies and ensure that 
cumulative causality functions in a virtuous manner, 
other forces are needed apart from market incentives, 
such as industrial and technological policies to induce 
the necessary changes in the productive structure. 
Moreover, policies that encourage import substitution in 
high-technology goods are even more necessary when 
the exchange rate has been appreciating on a sustained 
basis, as has been the case in the Brazilian economy 
since price stabilization, and particularly since 2004. 
Economic liberalization in a context of price stability 
and exchange-rate appreciation has had a positive influence 
on the industrial sector,16 by stimulating changes in the 
allocation of productive resources towards modernization 
of production processes.17 Nonetheless, modernization 
of the productive structure occurred despite the relatively 
low level of investment., Although the investment rate in 
the Brazilian economy was around 22% in the 1970s, it 
fell to around 17% between 1990 and 2010. The economic 
and financial liberalization of the early 1990s, together 
with market-oriented institutional reforms, provided 
a new macroeconomic scenario for private decisions, 
in which the competitive dynamic was stimulated.18 
Exchange-rate appreciation, together with the removal 
of tariff and nontariff barriers, made imported final 
products more competitive, thus generating a new pattern 
of competition with domestic production. This setting 
called for the modernization of productive processes and 
the introduction of new products, while exchange-rate 
appreciation also facilitated lower prices for imports and 
capital goods, thus contributing to the modernization of 
16  There is an extensive literature on the effects of economic liberalization 
for the industrial sector. See, Feijó (2003), Castro (2003) and Ferraz, 
Kupfer and Iootty (2004), among others. 
17  Industrial productivity remained unchanged from the mid-1980s, but 
improved in the first five years of the 1990s, thanks to trade liberalization. 
Nonetheless, there was a pronounced decline in employment in 
industrial sectors, since output expanded without a significant increase 
in the capital stock. See the analyses of the evolution of industrial 
productivity in Brazil contained in Bonelli (1996), Bacha and Bonelli 
(2005), Feijó and Carvalho (2002), and Nassif (2008a), among others. 
Nassif (2005) analyses the consequences of trade liberalization for 
the pattern of Brazil’s of foreign trade.
18  Erber (2010) reviews the changes that occurred in the macroeconomic 
scenario, specifically the emergence of a new development consensus. 
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production processes. Nonetheless, market forces alone 
were insufficient to induce a deeper structural change, 
which would have enabled the economy to make process 
in industrialization according to the sequence set forth 
by Kaldor.
Over the last few years, what explains the structural 
shift in favour of greater productive specialization is the 
combination of an over-valued exchange rate, particularly 
since 2004, and an improvement in the terms of trade. 
Between 2004 and 2010, the real appreciated by about 
60%, and the terms of trade rose by roughly 35%. The 
continuation of the appreciated exchange rate reduced 
the competitiveness of scale-and labour-intensive sectors, 
which resulted in a loss of share for those sectors within 
the productive structure. The terms-of-trade improvement 
favoured natural-resource-intensive sectors. Although 
the rise in commodity prices had a positive influence on 
economic growth, even in the context of an appreciated 
exchange rate, it accentuated the trend towards industrial 
specialization in those sectors. Table 1 shows that the 
period 1996-2007 saw progress in the productive structure 
of natural-resource-intensive sectors, among others, 
mineral extraction, oil refinery, and the food, beverages 
and tobacco, as well as scale-intensive sectors such as 
basic metallurgy.
In view of the above, the rise in the terms of trade 
could be leading to the economic predominance of 
natural-resource-exploiting sectors to the detriment of 
others, which would contribute to the contraction of the 
industrial sector. This effect is related to one of the forms 
of “Dutch disease”: expansion of the commodity sector 
and relative stagnation of the industrial goods sector.19 
Accordingly, persistent exchange-rate appreciation caused 
by an increase in net exports, compounded by increased 
demand for natural resources (mineral or agricultural 
commodities), could trigger a deindustrialization process 
unless policies are applied to counteract the negative 
effects of currency appreciation for industry, or if the 
policies applied for that purpose do not have much effect. 
The transmission mechanism for deindustrialization 
caused by “Dutch disease” would consist of a rise in 
the profitability of commodity exports and a fall in the 
profitability of other sectors. In the case of the current 
Brazilian economy, the exchange-rate appreciation trend 
shown in figure 7 would reduce the competitiveness of the 
19  The term “Dutch disease” was originally coined to describe the 
decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands, following 
the discovery of large gas reserves in the North Sea in the 1960s. 
Since then, the term has tended to be related to the “curse of natural 
resources”, although, strictly speaking, “Dutch disease” would be one 
manifestation of that curse. 
domestic industrial sector and strengthen the propensity 
towards stagnation in sectors based on differentiated 
technologies and scientific knowledge, while also causing 
a contraction of labour-and scale-intensive sectors, by 
raising foreign currency production costs in the stagnated 
sectors. The exchange-rate appreciation trend of the 
first decade of the new century has lasted on a sustained 
basis since mid-2004, and was only interrupted in the 
second half of 2008 owing to the worsening international 
financial crisis. 
Nonetheless, the declining relative importance 
of industry for long-term growth should not only be 
attributed to the recent improved terms of trade. Monetary 
policy management, which maintains a high interest-rate 
spread that attracts foreign-currency inflows in excess 
of balance of payments financing needs, as shown by 
the surplus on the capital and financial accounts, is one 
of the factors fuelling currency appreciation, which 
undermines the competitiveness of the industrial sector 
in the case of Brazil.20 Figure 8 shows the evolution of 
the balance of payments accounts as a proportion of gdp 
as from 1990. The trade balance has been positive since 
2000, and it has contributed to positive current account 
balances since 2003. These turned negative from 2007 
onwards, despite abundant inflows of external resources, 
which have generated an excessive accumulation of 
international reserves, representing 15% of gdp in 
2009. In addition to the pressure exerted by rising terms 
of trade, monetary policy has magnified the potential 
effect of “Dutch disease” and prolonged the exchange-
rate appreciation by maintaining the high interest-rate 
spread and attracting capital inflows.
It could therefore be argued that, even in a context 
of rising terms of trade, the trend declining share of 
the Brazilian industrial sector cannot be defined as a 
classic case of “Dutch disease” reflecting “the curse of 
20   Kaldor (1965, pp. 49 and 50) analyses the negative effects for 
development of an overvalued exchange rate, and calls for an exchange-
rate target to be set through economic policy. In the case of excessive 
appreciation, a medium and long-term target should be set. According 
to Kaldor, “the correct amount of devaluation […] presupposes strongly 
deflationary internal policies while the process of structural adjustment 
is going on, as well as a succession of downward adjustments in the 
exchange rate and not a single, once-for-all adjustment. The reason 
for this is that the acquisition of new markets and the adaptation of 
the internal production structure in favour of “international goods” 
takes time, and the exchange rate that may ultimately be necessary to 
attain the “target”, whether this is stated in terms of a share in world 
trade or in terms of a strong balance of payments position sustained 
without import restrictions, would represent an “excessive adjustment” 
if adopted initially — excessive, in that the economy could not respond 
to the changing relative prices, which would, consequently, the largely 
nullified by inflation.” 
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natural resources”. Moreover, the discovery of natural 
gas and petroleum in the pre-salt strata21 in 2006 cannot 
be seen as a potential cause of “Dutch disease”, since 
exploitation has not yet begun on a large scale. The relative 
deindustrialization of the Brazilian economy basically 
reflects the rising terms of trade for commodities, of 
which the country has abundant supply, and the exchange-
rate appreciation trend sustained by a monetary policy 
that maintains a large interest-rate spread in a context 
of high international liquidity. The second factor is no 
less significant than the first.22 
Following Kaldor’s logic, the positive effects of the 
commodity export boom since 2003 should have been 
harnessed to finance investments to promote growth 
in the more technically advanced sectors, to regain 
the import-substitution process and make it possible 
to ease the external constraint on solid foundations. 
This would require investments to expand the faster 
21 Geological strata formed before an extensive layer of salt, which 
can be more than 2,000 m thick.
22  Generally speaking, the debate on Brazilian “de-industrialization” 
has focused more on rising commodity prices than the role of monetary 
policy. See, among others, Bresser-Pereira (2008). Nassif, Feijó and 
Araújo (2011) analyse the factors that explain the change recorded in 
Brazil since 1999, giving prime importance to the interest rate spread. 
It should also be remembered that the post-Keynesian literature states 
that capital flows in emerging economies tend to be procyclical. See 
Resende and Amado (2007).
growing industrial sectors. Consequently, the increased 
import capacity should have been reversed, to expand 
possibilities for absorbing technological process through 
capital accumulation. As Salter pointed out many years 
ago (Salter, 1966, pp. 153 and 154), a high rate of 
investment is needed to change the productive structure 
rapidly and, depending on demand, generate increased 
output and higher productivity in sectors where faster 
technical progress is possible.
Pérez (2008) argues that the income generated by the 
commodity sector could finance a “jump to development”. 
This would depend on sustained technological updating of 
natural resource-based activities, which would gradually 
improve the export profile through continuous innovation 
of products, activities and related processes; and it would 
create goods of high value-added based on the traditional 
commodity market. The success of a strategy of this type 
might largely depend on the coordination of a development-
oriented economic policy, which leads to the creation 
of an “endogenous innovation nucleus” based on the 
favourable circumstances offered by the exploitation of 
natural resources in terms of generating demand.
The situation that has prevailed in Brazil over the 
last few years does not match that description. Cimoli 
and others (2005, pp. 32 and 33) note that the existence 
of abundant natural resources can sustain high growth 
rates for a time, without the need for major investment 
to create technology; but the availability of natural 
FIGURE 8
Balance of payments account balances and international reserves  





















































Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
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resources alone cannot sustain long-term growth. There 
are two reasons for this: 
(i) Growth based on factor abundance does not promote 
structural change; and the increased productivity 
throughout the economy reproduces undesired 
situations of distributive inequality, poor job quality, 
and structural heterogeneity; and 
(ii) Growth is more vulnerable to changes in the 
international economy and the behaviour of external 
demand. This leads these authors to conclude that 
the economy is less vulnerable when the source of 
growth is income contributed by technology and 
knowledge production, which makes it possible to 
respond to changes in the competitive framework. 
In contrast, it is much harder for that to happen 
when the income source is highly dependent on an 
abundant resource, owing to the lack of technological 
capacity needed to adapt the economy to the 
new context. 
According to the Kaldorian-structuralist literature 
on economic growth, therefore, in Brazil over the last 
30 years the larger share of industrial sectors based on 
natural resources in the productive structure implies 
slower long-term gdp growth and greater vulnerability 
to external crises, particularly those involving a slump 
in external demand. This means that the long-term gdp 
growth rate, in a framework of balance of payments 
equilibrium, will be lower than what it could be, 
particularly compared to the rapid growth period in the 
context of development-oriented policies. If industrial 
sectors based on differentiated technologies and scientific 
knowledge grew at least as fast as natural-resource-based 
sectors and the agriculture and service sectors, they 
could give the Brazilian economy long-term growth 
rates above those achieved in the last decade, such as 
those achieved in the period between the end of World 
War II and 1980. Clearly, the stimulus to rapid growth 
in industrial sectors based on differentiated technologies 
and scientific knowledge, and the expansion of their share 
in industrial gdp, would respond to an industrial policy 
oriented towards the development of an endogenous 
technology core —in other words State participation 
is the source of incentives for industrial development 
oriented towards an increase in the technological content 
of the goods and services produced in the country. The 
recommendation made by Ocampo and Vos (2008), for 
peripheral economies to expand the scope of policies 
to promote sustained growth, can be interpreted in the 
same way.
Brazil’s current productive structure, and its 
reflection in the trade balance, are the outcome of the 
historical industrial and economic development process. 
According to Kaldor (1966 and 1970) and Fajnzylber 
(1983), if industry had diversified more intensively, the 
structure would remain incomplete owing to its relatively 
small share in industrial gdp and the recurrent trade 
deficit of the technology-intensive sectors. Moreover, 
the ongoing exploitation of Brazil’s abundant natural 
resource endowment, in a context of rising terms of 
trade, has the corollary of exchange-rate appreciation that 
is magnified by the interest-rate spread, and industrial 
weakening that starts in technology-intensive sectors. 
According to the approach followed by Kaldor (1966 
and 1970) and Fajnzylber (1983), “Dutch disease” will 
set a trap for the development process by restricting the 
growth of the more technologically intensive industrial 
sectors. In the case of Brazil, the trap could arise when 
the exploitation of oil and natural gas reserves from the 
pre-salt strata reaches its peak, which would turn the 
country into a large-scale exporter of those commodities. 
IV 
Final comments
Intensification of the current trend of Brazilian industry 
toward specialization in natural-resource- intensive 
sectors, together with a relative contraction of sectors 
that make intensive use of technology, especially those 
producing capital goods, will move Brazilian industry 
away from the maturation process posited by Kaldor. 
Moreover, following the interpretation of this author, 
not all possibilities for development of Brazilian 
industry offered by the industrialization process have 
been exhausted. 
In terms of Kaldor’s development phases, the 
Brazilian productive structure faces the challenge 
of deepening phases three and four to reduce the 
external constraint on growth, particularly in relation 
to sectors based on differentiated technologies and 
scientific knowledge. Consequently, the main obstacle 
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to exploiting the country’s long-term growth potential 
is not the declining share of industrial output in gdp, 
but the stagnation or shrinking share in industrial gdp 
of sectors that make very intensive use of technologies. 
According to Kaldor’s cumulative causality mechanism, 
lack of progress in the industrialization process will lead 
to less favourable participation in trade flows, thereby 
lowering the Brazilian economy’s long-term growth rate, 
which could become trapped in a vicious growth circle, 
rather than evolving in a virtuous circle.
The economic liberalization since the 1990s, together 
with exchange-rate appreciation have contributed to 
a structural change in industry. Although that change 
has helped modernize the industrial fabric, it has also 
discouraged exports and the creation and production of 
national technology, owing to the combined effect of a 
high real interest rate and exchange-rate appreciation. 
These would be the first symptoms of “Dutch disease”.
The terms of trade increase that started in 2003 has 
had a positive effect on Brazilian gdp growth since then, 
even with a lower exchange rate and high real interest 
rates, which typically discourage exports and investments 
in high-technology goods. Accordingly, while significant 
variables such as the exchange rate and interest rates hinder 
sustained growth, this has been achieved in the current 
phase through rising prices in the commodities for which 
Brazil is one of the world’s leading producers. It needs 
to be asked whether this type of growth is sustainable 
in the long term. Kaldor’s theory would suggest not.
As noted by Pérez (2008) and Rodrik (2010), unlike 
what happens with specialization, the diversification of 
industrial sectors is essential for sustained economic 
growth, since it allows for a wider range of productive 
activities and more balanced shares among the 
manufacturing sectors. In contrast, the perverse 
combination that has developed in Brazil between rising 
terms of trade, an appreciated exchange rate and high 
real interest rates has had the opposite effect of turning 
the Brazilian economy into a specialized, albeit modern, 
economy, and narrowing the range of industrial activities, 
in other words causing sector concentration. Holland 
and Porcile (2005, p. 61) argue that specialization in 
sectors with little or no technological intensity would 
reduce to capacity of less technologically developed 
economies, particularly developing countries such 
as Brazil, to diversify their productive structure on a 
competitive basis, in other words without the need for 
tariff protection or falling relative wages. Consequently, 
attaining the objectives of easing the external constraint 
and convergence in terms of productivity requires 
investments in technology that are reflected in the 
production of consumer goods and durable goods to 
supply both the domestic and external markets. 
(Original: Portuguese)
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